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The new Indian government of Prime Minister Narendra Modi has revitalized the country’s economic and foreign 
policy prospects after years of drift under the previous Congress Party-led administration. India today is showing 
a new intensity of engagement with East Asian powers like China and Japan, and with its South Asian neighbors. 
The Modi administration is also incrementally but tangibly reforming the country’s statist economy in order to 
seed growth and produce the jobs necessary to employ what is becoming the world’s biggest workforce. To date, 
European focus on Asia has primarily been on China; it is time for Europe to seize the moment in relations with 
Asia’s other emerging giant to promote peace, pluralism, and prosperity.
Executive Summary
Policy Recommendations
 EU-India negotiations over a comprehensive free trade agreement have been in the doldrums for several years, 
in part due to the absence of economic reform and the protectionist/interventionist instincts of the previous 
Indian government. Now that India is generating rapid economic growth under a reformist new leadership 
that is opening new sectors of the Indian economy to trade and foreign investment, EU officials should 
prioritize conclusion of an FTA as the centerpiece of Europe-India relations.
 Europe and India also share a compelling set of domestic security concerns, particularly with respect to 
home-grown radicalization and terrorism.  Both Europe and India are also buffeted by the extremist currents 
emanating from parts of the greater Middle East. The two sides therefore should launch a regular strategic 
dialogue on terrorism, homeland security, and counter-extremism – including how to protect and enlarge 
internet freedom.
  The EU and the United States should cooperate more systematically to develop a new transatlantic strategy for 
Pakistan. Closer US-European collaboration to strengthen Pakistani civil society, improve the rule of law and 
civilian government administration, and expand nuclear weapons safeguards would not only support Western 
interests; it would ease India’s security conundrum vis-à-vis a neighbor that sponsors terrorism against it.
Daniel Twining
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Implications for Europe
What does India’s foreign policy under Narendra Modi hold for relations with its 
South Asian neighborhood and East Asia? On the campaign trail before India’s pivo-
tal national elections in May 2014, Modi suggested that his economic revitalization 
agenda would require an external focus on relations with key global trade and tech-
nology powers, including Japan, China, Germany, and the United States. Yet Modi 
surprised both his own Ministry of External Affairs and his neighbors by inviting the 
leaders of eight South Asian nations to his inauguration (a first in the history of the 
Republic of India), holding bilateral meetings with them as one of his earliest acts 
of official business, and making early official visits to Bhutan and Nepal. Similarly, 
the first official trips by Indian Foreign Minister Sushma Swaraj were to Bangladesh 
and Nepal.  Prime Minister Modi made an early trip to Japan and, just before an in-
augural visit to Washington, DC, hosted Chinese President Xi Jinping in New Delhi.
These early moves in foreign policy suggest an intense focus on India’s South Asi-
an neighborhood as well as on the giant northern neighbor with which it shares a 
2500-mile border. As Ministry of External Affairs spokesman Syed Akbaruddin put 
it last summer, “The prime minister‘s inbox relating to foreign policy is very crow-
ded. India‘s foreign policy priorities are in the neighborhood” (Reuters 6 June 2014). 
Far from being a problem for leaders in Europe and the United States who covet 
closer ties with a resurgent India, a foreign policy that starts close to home may be 
a good thing. India cannot rise to become a world power if it does not tend to its 
own backyard.
India can neither achieve its development potential nor rise to become a respected 
world power as long as its neighborhood remains a morass of suspicious and fragile 
states – rather than one in which security and prosperity are mutually reinforcing 
foundations for India’s global ambitions. Modi himself has made the point that 
foreign policy starts at home, and that only a strong and vigorous India that gets its 
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domestic house in order will be respected abroad (Jaishankar 2014).
 
This is true not only with respect to India’s lesser neighbors and to the world’s 
developed nations but also with regard to China. It is India’s primary peer com-
petitor and the growing concern of its strategic establishment. On the campaign 
trail, Modi lambasted the previous Congress-led government for not standing up 
to Beijing sufficiently in defense of Indian interests. He promised a robust policy 
to push back against China’s claims to Indian territory. Prime Minister Modi’s ad-
ministration has increased India’s defense budget by over 12 percent and is over-
seeing a focused build-up of military and civilian infrastructure along the contested 
India-China border to enhance India’s ability to police it. Despite these moves to 
improve India’s position in the regional balance of power, to observers like Coomi 
Kapoor, Modi also seems “enamored” of China given its development record and 
the possibility of harnessing – or even replicating – it to serve India’s own growth 
requirements (Kapoor 2014).    
On the other hand, Modi is keenly aware of the competitive nature of India-China 
relations and, as demonstrated by his early moves in foreign policy, his focus on the 
South Asian neighborhood is partly a function of the India-China contest. India’s 
leadership understands that lesser regional states’ penetration by China undermi-
nes India’s security and traditional economic hinterland – and that both Indian se-
curity and development require New Delhi to be suzerain of the subcontinent, as it 
was before 1947.
This paper will assess the prospects for India’s foreign policy towards its neighbor-
hood under Narendra Modi, with a focus on China, Japan, Pakistan, and Afghanis-
tan. The goal is to give European readers a picture of how India’s economic and 
security prospects are tied to East Asia and the South Asian neighborhood – and 
how European policymakers can act on these understandings to deepen cooperati-
on with India across the economic and security spectrum. 
2. The Economic Imperative 
India under Modi has embraced a multi-vector approach to foreign policy that 
includes not only a neighborhood strategy but a far-reaching effort to enlarge trade 
and investment relations with the West, Japan, and China. The overarching objective 
of this grand strategy is to fuel economic growth at home so that India can improve 
both its people’s welfare and its security.
According to economic historian Angus Maddison, the Indian economy was the 
world’s largest in the early 17th century, comprising some 25 percent of global GDP 
(Maddison 2006, p. 638). South Asia was historically a natural economic space that 
was shattered by the 1947 partition and the hostility that developed between India 
and several of its immediate neighbors, starting with Pakistan, in the decades that 
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followed. Similarly, the old trading networks between northern India and Tibet 
were closed off when the Chinese army invaded Tibet in 1950 and again in 1959, 
and following the Sino-Indian conflict of 1962. Today South Asia is the world’s least 
economically integrated region, with only 5% of total trade being intra-regional 
(World Bank 2014). India-China trade is more developed but is unbalanced, politically 
controversial, and falls far short of matching the obvious complementarities between 
these large Asian economies. 
We should not forget how poor the average Indian still is – and how Modi’s task is not 
simply satisfying an urban middle-class’ aspiration for the good life, but uplifting an 
“aam aadmi” (common man) that still dreams of making it into the consumer class. 
The average Indian has a per capita income of only $1500 – compared with $6200 
in China, $10,700 in Turkey, and $11,300 in Brazil (World Bank 2013). Nearly one out 
of every two Indian children is malnourished. A quarter of the population lives on 
less than $2 a day. Over half of Indians do not have access to modern sanitation or 
regular electricity supply (Harris 2014).  
Modi’s campaign promise of “toilets over temples” speaks to the humdrum but 
essential needs of the majority of Indians. His decisive electoral victory underlines 
the failure of previous Indian governments to deliver even the basics of rudimentary 
development. Strategists focused on India’s great power rise and its implications for 
India and the world must remember this home truth: a forward policy of military 
and diplomatic leadership abroad is not politically sustainable in India’s democratic 
system unless the government can tie foreign policy partnerships to domestic 
development goals. This applies in the positive sense (for example, relations with 
Japan can deliver technology and infrastructure for India) but also in the negative 
sense (for example, India’s encirclement by China in its neighborhood could stymie 
India’s development by producing dangerous insecurities).
3. China: Protracted Contest
The history of Indian foreign policy and Sino-Indian relations suggests that India 
will not concede to live under Chinese dominion in a unipolar Asia. The success of 
national revitalisation policies by Narendra Modi in India (and Shinzo Abe in Japan) 
will do much to determine the degree of multipolarity in 21st century Asia. In that 
sense, the best thing Prime Minister Modi can do for the Asian balance of power, 
and India’s position within it, is to get the economy growing as rapidly as possible.
Unlike in 1962 when the balance of capabilities between them was quite even, 
China today has a military budget four times larger than India’s – and which is 
qualitatively superior by a larger multiple than that on account of China’s advanced 
technological lead and focused investments in asymmetric and power-projection 
capabilities (Twining 2014c).  China has pulled ahead decisively over the past decade, 
making it more accurate to talk about the “imbalance of power” between them than 
any kind of stable balance of power. This is dangerous for India and destabilizing 
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for the region. Modi has explicitly linked his agenda of economic revitalization to 
the need to modernize India’s defense base, pointing out that a lackluster economy 
cannot provide a resource base adequate for India’s armed forces.
Like the military budget, the Chinese economy is also four times larger than India’s 
– with the result that even lower Chinese growth in the current 7.5 percent range, 
given its broader base, produces “a new India” in GDP terms every two years, as 
former Goldman Sachs executive Jim O’Neill likes to point out (O’Neill 2013). In 
economic terms, India is not yet any kind of peer to China; Chinese officials look 
down on their southern neighbor’s underdevelopment and the ineffective delivery 
of government institutions.  Prime Minister Modi needs to regenerate the kind of 
rapid economic growth India enjoyed in the 2000s – when it managed consistent 
annual GDP expansion in the 8-10 percent range (and even grew faster than China 
for several quarters) – to prevent China from pulling further ahead. Ultimately, 
however, India may be able to close the gap as its demographic dividend combined 
with China’s middle-income-trap slowdown reverses the momentum. Already, 
India is set to grow faster than China from 2016 and is likely to sustain superior 
growth thereafter, given its lower base and assuming continued economic reform.
In the near term, the magnitude of China’s economic and military lead reinforces 
the contention that China could become Asia’s dominant power. A key question is 
whether Chinese superiority makes Modi’s India more likely to bandwagon with 
it – or to balance against it more vigorously. Former National Security Advisor 
Shivshankar Menon identified the key to a stable China-India relationship along 
their disputed border as the result of an Indian policy “to maintain an equilibrium 
(or prevent the emergence of a significant imbalance)” (Menon 2013). This is balance-
of-power logic acknowledged about as candidly as a public official can. 
Modi is likely to be even more frank in defining a future that makes India a peer to 
China rather than a satellite of it. His own instincts appear to lean in this direction, 
as do those of his constituency in the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), the 
Hindu nationalist civic organization in which Modi was once a volunteer. The 
General Secretary of the ruling BJP, Ram Madhav, a close advisor to Modi in foreign 
policy, argues that India and China are destined for competition, and that India 
should take steps including more strongly supporting Tibetan autonomy in order 
to maintain strategic pressure on Beijing (Madhav 2014). There is an ideological 
basis in favor of Shreshtha Bharat (Strong India) that animates Hindu nationalist 
supporters of the ruling BJP, as expressed in its 2014 campaign manifesto. 
The Sino-Indian power mismatch has important strategic consequences – including 
that India cannot rely purely on internal balancing against China but must pursue 
external alignments to compensate for India’s relative weakness. Yet Indians are 
wary of entrapment in any US design to “contain” China – and, conversely, of any 
Sino-American “G-2” condominium that prejudices New Delhi’s interests in favor of 
Beijing’s. Hence the continued development under Modi of a deepening India-Japan 
strategic axis in particular, in which structural pressures to align are reinforced by 
the hawkish nationalism shared by leaders in Tokyo and New Delhi (Twining 2014a).
In 2014 Prime Minister Modi took office after a campaign in which he cannily 
challenged Chinese territorial revisionism even as he promised to boost India-
China business ties. During the campaign, he promised to resist China’s “mindset 
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of expansion” and accused the previous Indian government of “making a mockery 
of itself with its limited and timid approach” to India’s primary strategic competitor 
(Twining 2014b).  
While there may be differences in tone, in fact, India’s previous Congress Party-led 
government sought to build up India’s military power against China. Steps taken 
included stationing a new combat air wing along their contested border, standing 
up a new mountain division to help secure it, and improving the road infrastructure 
that would enable rapid reinforcement of Indian positions in the northeast against 
any Chinese incursion. The previous government also put in place a plan to develop 
three aircraft carrier battle groups by the 2020s – a larger number than China 
currently possesses – and tested missiles capable of hitting Shanghai and Beijing. 
Modi is likely to continue these policies, and to accelerate them as a growing 
economy provides a larger resource base for military modernization. 
China-India trade relations are complicated and as much a source of friction as of 
cooperation. Bilateral trade totaled $65.5 billion in 2013, down from $66.5 billion 
in 2012 and nearly $74 billion in 2011 (Embassy of India, Beijing n.d.). India’s trade 
deficit with China reached a record $31.4 billion in 2013 as Indian exports to China 
declined by nearly 10 percent year-on-year (Krishnan 2014).  
China is India’s single largest national trading partner in goods (the United States is 
India’s largest national trading partner in goods and services combined). However, 
the composition of Indian exports to China is almost entirely raw materials, whereas 
Chinese exports to India consist mainly of cheap manufactured goods. This creates 
an imbalance that fuels political controversy within India as an element of growing 
security competition with China.  India has raised steep barriers to Chinese direct 
investment in sensitive sectors such as telecommunications, again because of a 
perceived threat from a less-than-transparent China. Indians have protested at the 
importation of Chinese workers, rather than the hiring of Indian ones, for Chinese 
infrastructure projects in India.  
For all these reasons, Sino-Indian trade has been more a source of rivalry than 
reassurance. Prime Minister Modi has made clear that India under his leadership 
will do business with China, given the development imperative. As Chief Minister of 
Gujarat, he visited China several times to generate trade and investment in his state.
The Chinese Communist Party’s English newspaper Global Times has predicted that 
Modi, often depicted as a nationalist firebrand in Western media, is “likely to be 
pragmatic towards China” (Yang 2014).  China’s Foreign Minister has played up 
the developmental synergies with Modi’s India that could deepen their economic 
interdependence to mutual benefit. On his official visit to India last September, 
President Xi Jinping pledged $20 billion in new Chinese investments in India (Times 
of India 2014).
Chinese analysts expect Modi to take a tougher line on political disputes, including 
the border and the future of Tibet, even as he seeks to enlarge economic exchange. 
At the same time, Modi appears to understand that replicating China’s development 
miracle in India will require reducing barriers to Chinese direct investment. 
Although India will remain sensitive towards Chinese investment in sectors like 
telecommunications and infrastructure, it is also true that leaving the sectors 
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4. The India-Japan Entente
In Asia, New Delhi has moved from its “look east” policy to one of “acting 
east,” particularly with regard to forging the foundations of a potentially far-
reaching economic and strategic partnership with Japan. The obvious economic 
complementarities between Japan, as East Asia’s technology leader, and India, with 
its vast human capital and developmental requirements, make India-Japan trade 
and investment ties among the more exciting, if underappreciated, economic 
relationships in 21st century Asia.  
The convergence of concern over managing China’s rise and protecting the security 
of sea lanes further unites Japan and India. So does their joint engagement of 
Southeast Asia, where both countries are actively supporting Myanmar’s political 
and economic opening while systematically engaging strategically important 
emerging players like Indonesia and Vietnam. Both Tokyo and New Delhi are also 
playing a greater role in institutions led by the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) to prevent these forums from tilting in a Sinocentric direction and 
to boost regional webs of economic connectivity. The current nationalist leaders 
in Tokyo and New Delhi, similarly focused on revitalizing economic growth and 
managing the China challenge, look set to push forward their far-ranging economic 
and security partnership. 
Prime Ministers Abe and Modi have declared that an Indo-Japanese axis of interests 
and values could redraw the strategic map of Asia, ensuring the freedom of the sea 
lanes knitting the Indian and Pacific oceans together and creating a democratic 
counterweight to authoritarian challengers (for more on this subject see Twining 
(2013) “The Indo-Japanese Strategic Partnership: Asia’s Response to China’s Rise” 
in Asan Forum). Japan’s investment in port, road, rail, and pipeline infrastructure 
in Myanmar is expressly designed to build a land-and-sea bridge connecting India 
and Japan across mainland Southeast Asia.  The Japanese and Indian navies have 
exercised together in the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean.  Partnership with an 
underdeveloped through foreign investment restrictions may constitute an equal 
or greater source of insecurity by constraining India’s development. The new BRICS 
Bank and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank offer India avenues to secure 
Chinese capital and direct investment without the complicated politics of the 
bilateral channel (Harding, 2014).
This dualism is likely to be the defining feature of Sino-Indian relations in the period 
ahead: an intensifying security competition between the two Asian giants combined 
with deeper economic interdependence between them. Like other Asian leaders, 
Modi will thus need to balance a growing security dilemma vis-à-vis China against 
the magnetic appeal of its market as a spur to domestic economic growth.  Indeed, 
Modi’s hawkishness may provide him the political cover to open India further to 
Chinese business.
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increasingly powerful India may in fact be essential to Japan’s continued leadership 
in Asia in the shadow of Chinese power, giving Japan a quasi-alliance option with 
Asia’s other emerging giant. Absence of such an alignment could, in the event of US 
retrenchment, relegate Japan to strategic isolation or “Finlandization.”
For all China’s economic dynamism, Japan may ultimately prove more important to 
India’s modernization drive than China. It is Japan’s investment in developing vast 
Indian industrial corridors that could lay the foundation for the mass-manufacturing 
base India lacks. It is Japanese companies, more so than Chinese, that view India 
as a platform for industrial production, both for what eventually will become the 
world’s largest internal market (in population terms) and for export.  
Nor do Japanese industrial titans present the same political risks to India as the 
state-owned enterprises which sit at the summit of the Chinese economy.  Chinese 
foreign direct investments and (sometimes failed) acquisitions have created well-
deserved controversy in India on national security grounds – precisely because 
the Chinese private sector is not always “private” but can act as an arm of the 
Chinese state. By contrast, the comfort level between New Delhi and Tokyo not 
only renders such concerns irrelevant but could even lead to Japanese export of 
defense technologies and military co-production arrangements of a kind difficult to 
imagine between India and China.
5. India‘s South Asian Neighborhood
In many respects, India has less a global foreign policy than a “neighborhood 
policy” given its intense focus on the troubled lesser states of the subcontinent. 
The general problem historically has been India’s disproportionate power relative 
to these smaller South Asian neighbors, as well as New Delhi’s imperial inheritance 
of exercising suzerainty over the subcontinent. India’s own complicated domestic 
politics further complicate its foreign relations. Under the previous administration, 
a historic water-sharing agreement with Bangladesh was nixed due to opposition 
from the ruling Trinamool Congress in West Bengal. Tamil politics in southern 
India limited New Delhi’s engagement with the previous Sri Lankan government of 
President Mahinda Rajapaksa. Modi’s large governing majority makes his foreign 
policy less susceptible to such coalition calculations, but they will remain a factor.
In turn, at least until recently, domestic politics in neighboring states have been 
driven in part by political actors’ degree of opposition to India. In Nepal, a Maoist 
insurgency enjoying Chinese support toppled the pro-Indian political order leading 
to the abolition of the monarchy in 2008.  In Sri Lanka, India’s censure of the Rajapaksa 
government over the mistreatment of its Tamil minority helped encourage Colombo 
to build a privileged relationship with Beijing; Sri Lanka’s new president, Maithripala 
Sirisena, won the January 2015 election partly on the platform of restoring the island 
nation’s traditionally close relationship with India. In Bangladesh, domestic politics 
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revolve around the legacy of the 1971 war of independence, in which India decisively 
intervened to secure the country’s secession from Pakistan; how to manage border 
controls and trade relations with Bangladesh’s giant Indian neighbor; and the 
struggle against violent extremism in Bangladesh, which has in the past been used 
as a launchpad for attacks on India.  
Prime Minister Modi’s revitalized neighborhood policy signals a new focus in New 
Delhi on resolving conflicts in South Asia in order to economically integrate the 
region and mitigate security challenges within it. Restoring the strategic unity of 
the subcontinent through economic enmeshment and positive-sum security ties 
is a compelling requirement for India’s emergence as a genuine global power. As 
former Foreign Secretary and current Chairman of the National Security Advisory 
Board Shyam Saran argues:
“It is India’s neighborhood that holds the key to its emergence as a regional and global 
power. If India’s neighborhood is politically unstable and economically deprived, there 
will be bigger challenges to India’s security and its own economic prospects. India’s 
security is inseparable from that of the Indian subcontinent.  Its economic destiny is 
likewise enmeshed with that of its neighbors. Here is an opportunity to clear the decks 
in our neighborhood, so that India is able to break out of its subcontinental confines 
and expand its footprint beyond its borders” (Saran 2014).
This is an urgent task. India punches below its weight in world affairs, and shows a 
strange insularity on issues like the conflict in Syria which should centrally concern 
a nation with nearly 200 million Muslims, in part because of the need to play 
defense to manage the pathologies of its neighborhood. These not only threaten 
India’s security by producing terrorism, refugees, and weak states along its borders. 
They also invite penetration by outside powers like China, eroding India’s natural 
leadership of its wider region. To become a world power, India will need not only 
to transform itself but to transform its neighborhood into one that is an asset to its 
development and security rather than an obstacle to them.
6. Pakistan: Triumph of Experience over Hope
Candidate Modi praised the last BJP government’s foreign policy for blending 
shanti and shakti – peace and power. The hawkish Atal Bihari Vajpayee, who ruled 
from 1998-2004, combined these elements in his outreach to, and military buildup 
against, Pakistan.  Modi surprised many when, during the campaign, he cited the 
1999 Lahore Declaration, a visionary statement by Indian and Pakistani leaders of 
support for a normalized relationship, as an example of how his BJP predecessor 
reached out to a hostile neighbor. Vajpayee’s search for détente with Pakistan 
was possible because he was bullet-proofed by his hawkishness against charges 
of appeasement – as is Prime Minister Modi, whose outspokenness against the 
dangers of Pakistan-based terrorism is well-established. 
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Modi said during the campaign that he would prefer to have good relations with a 
Pakistan that did not export terrorism to India or escalate tensions along the Line 
of Control. Rather than simply calling on Pakistan to end terrorism against India 
for the sake of friendly relations and its own security, Modi linked the rollback of 
Pakistan-based extremism to the country’s development prospects – arguing that 
Pakistan cannot modernize as long as it produces such internal insecurity and 
exports it to India. To escape poverty, argued candidate Modi, Pakistan must end 
terrorism for 10 years rather than targeting India through conventional and sub-
conventional means. “Bombs, guns and pistols have failed to do any good for the 
people of Pakistan. If … Pakistan has to fight a war, it should be a war on poverty, 
illiteracy and superstition” (Mandhana 2013).
Modi also argued that, as with China, the first priority for management of bilateral 
relations is building up Indian strength and vigorously defending Indian interests. 
No amount of diplomatic ingenuity can avert India’s security dilemma with each 
country if India itself is weak and flailing rather than strong and clear-headed. 
“Every other day, we face new threats from our neighbors, Pakistan and China,” 
candidate Modi said in September 2013. “But the problem is not on our borders, the 
real problem is in New Delhi. Until we have a strong, patriotic government in Delhi, 
we can’t guarantee the security of this country” (Mandhana 2013).
Modi has promised to get tough on terrorism. One way to do so will be to build 
bridges to Pakistani political forces who oppose militant violence against India – 
starting with Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, who also happened to be the prime 
minister who joined Vajpayee in making the Lahore Declaration. A thriving Indian 
economy more open to Pakistani trade and investment could help uplift all of South 
Asia and enlarge the Pakistani constituency for peace, if Modi is bold enough to 
move forward with an economic integration agenda that undercuts the power of 
the Pakistan Army in the country’s political life – particularly at a time when the 
Pakistani state is under assault from home-grown terrorism.
Here Modi’s efforts to breathe life into the Indian economy could help. The more 
a rapidly growing, dynamic India pulls away from its failing neighbor – and the 
more India’s nearly 200 million Muslims share in the fruits of modernization – the 
greater a magnetic effect it will have on Pakistani society beleaguered by lack of 
opportunity, a predatory state and armed forces, and various forms of violent Sunni 
extremism. This is where Modi’s no-nonsense developmentalism could become a 
significant national security asset, as Indian growth and promises to uplift its region 
enlarge the internal constituency within Pakistani society for normal relations.  
But several cautions are in order. First, the détente under Vajpayee and Nawaz was 
rapidly aborted by two other Pakistani stakeholders: the Army and Punjabi militant 
groups.  In the 1999 Kargil War, the Pakistan Army undercut the nascent Indo-Pak 
peace process without the sanction of Nawaz’s civilian government, which was 
subsequently deposed in General Musharraf ’s 1999 coup. In the 2001 attack on 
the Indian parliament, Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed played the role of 
spoilers, leading to another near-war on the subcontinent as India massed a million 
soldiers on the Pakistani border.      
Second, Pakistani society has changed drastically since that period. Sectarian 
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violence is far worse; a range of extremist militants have been strengthened by the 
experience of attacking Western forces and Indian civilians in Afghanistan, as well 
as by their own success in high-profile strikes like the Mumbai attacks of November 
2008. Moreover, the global currents of Islamic radicalization look stronger in some 
ways than in the pre-9/11 era, given their dispersion out of Afghanistan, the turmoil 
following the Arab revolutions, and the collapse of the Syrian state at the hands 
of marauding sectarian extremists. Liberal Pakistani political leaders like Benazir 
Bhutto and Salman Taseer have been assassinated. The Pakistani media General 
Musharraf liberated from state control has become more nationalistic, anti-Western, 
anti-Indian, and broadly illiberal; murder rates of journalists remain alarmingly 
high, with the few TV personalities who uncompromisingly defend liberalism living 
under armed guard. 
 
Along with the continuing strong role of the Army, these trends have shrunk the 
space for peaceful civil society in Pakistan. The leadership of the Army, currently 
engaged in a major counter-insurgency campaign in North Waziristan, continues 
to define India as the archenemy and prepares to intensify the “Great Game” in 
post-NATO Afghanistan – even as violent extremists step up attacks on military and 
civilian targets in Pakistan’s urban core. In short, Modi confronts a very different 
Pakistan than did Vajpayee. Rather than asking the civilian prime minister in 
Islamabad to deliver more than he can given the Army’s veto, Modi’s best approach 
may be to grow the Indian economy as rapidly as possible, modernize the armed 
forces as fulsomely as he can, and project a message of toughness against terrorism 
designed to deter at least the Pakistan Army, if not all of its assets, from risking an 
attack on India via its proxies. 
 
Modi does not need normalization of relations with Pakistan to achieve his 
economic goals, but he does need time and (relative) peace. The strategy must be 
to change the equation both between India and Pakistan – by extending India’s 
economic lead through sustained growth – and within Pakistan. The latter will 
require convincing key social groups and the Army that there is no future for their 
country if a permanent cold war cuts Pakistan off from an enormous market that 
should uplift its neighbors over time as powerfully as China’s growth has catalyzed 
the industrialization of Southeast Asian nations.
7. Afghanistan: Back to the 1990s?
To the considerable extent that Pakistan is complicit in supporting the Taliban and 
anti-Indian militant groups in Afghanistan – and given Rawalpindi’s acute insecurity 
about New Delhi’s warm ties with Kabul – Afghanistan’s status as a cockpit of Indo-
Pakistan rivalry will only intensify as the US military drawdown proceeds. On the one 
hand, Afghanistan since late 2001 has in many ways been a positive story for Indian 
interests: NATO forces eradicated Al Qaeda there, rolled back Pakistani influence 
by deposing the Taliban, and put in place a government extremely friendly to India. 
Indian policy must also be judged in many ways a success. It has been one of 
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Afghanistan’s largest donors; its assistance projects and training of civil and security 
personnel have contributed importantly to democratic state-building; the Karzai 
government signed a wide-ranging strategic partnership agreement with New 
Delhi; the new government led by Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah is friendly 
to India, and its top officials have strong personal ties to it. On the other hand, all 
these gains are put at risk by the US withdrawal. Modi’s India faces an intensifying 
set of challenges from the Taliban’s resilience with Pakistani sponsorship, the 
continuing strength of Afghan-based Pakistani assets like the Haqqani network, 
and the encouragement these and other unfortunate developments have given to 
India’s (and the United States’) adversaries.
That India has much to play for in Afghanistan is attested by the number of attacks 
against its personnel and facilities there at the hands of the Haqqani network, 
Lashkar-e-Taiba, and other assets of Pakistan’s ISI. Given its proximity, Modi 
has perhaps more of a stake than the United States does in the country’s future 
disposition. This was underlined when a terrorist attack on the Indian consulate 
in Herat in the run-up to his inauguration as prime minister seemed intended to 
produce an Indian hostage crisis that would embarrass his government. It echoed 
the hijacking of an Indian airline in 1999 and its diversion to Taliban-controlled 
Kandahar by Pakistani-based terrorist group Harkat-ul-Mujahideen. India’s 
adversaries would indeed have benefited from a hostage standoff in May 2014 that 
made Modi look weak – essentially calling a bluff on his tough talk against terrorism 
– right out of the box.
Modi’s pragmatism makes him likely to pursue in Afghanistan a course similar to 
that of the previous BJP government before the September 2001 attacks changed 
the game – that of working with Russia and Iran to support the Afghan government 
in Kabul, the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), and non-Taliban armed 
elements outside it.  The strategy can now be complemented by intelligence-sharing 
and other forms of cooperation with the United States, an option not available to 
India before 2001. 
If the unity of the ANSF weakens or the security forces fracture as withdrawal of 
foreign financing and on-the-ground partnership erodes their cohesion, Modi’s 
government – including its special services – will have a powerful incentive to 
support the “good” warlords and their militias which emerge against the Afghan 
Taliban and Afghan-based Pakistani allies like the Haqqanis. Unlike in the 1990s, the 
correlation of forces in Afghanistan even in the event of weakening central authority 
and the fracturing of the ANSF should be far more favorable to India, given the 
positive legacies of the last decade-plus of Western intervention in Afghanistan. Of 
course, India’s preference would be for the United States to overturn its declared 
policy of total withdrawal by 2016 and instead maintain a residual security force in 
Afghanistan to work alongside the ANSF to preserve the gains of the past 14 years. 
AUS-Iranian nuclear deal that allows Tehran to come in from the cold will also make 
Indian collaboration with Iran in Afghanistan more straightforward and acceptable 
to partners like the United States. Such cooperation will be reinforced by Modi’s 
focus on accelerating India’s economic growth, incentivizing him to increase 
reliance on an internationally-normalized Iran’s energy supplies after the previous 
government in New Delhi prudently decreased Iranian energy imports in response 
to international sanctions and direct pressure from Washington.  
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Modi is also likely to unsentimentally cooperate with Russia in Afghanistan given 
their common interests. Indeed, the strange vigor with which sections of the 
Indian strategic establishment not only excused but defended Russia’s invasion 
of Crimea reflected the continuing belief that Indo-Russian partnership in areas 
like Afghanistan could become even more important in the vacuum left by the US 
retreat. India also wants to draw Moscow away from a nascent axis with Beijing, 
epitomized in their recent 30-year, $400 billion energy deal, by demonstrating the 
virtues of cooperation with India in areas like Afghanistan.
  
Modi’s administration will also have an interest in closely monitoring and if possible 
blocking the expansion of China’s penetration of Afghanistan (for more on China’s 
penetration of Pakistan and Afghanistan see Small 2015). Thus far this has mainly 
taken commercial form through an enormous Chinese contract to mine copper 
and build associated infrastructure at Mes Aynak. But as China has demonstrated 
through its expanding presence in the Indian Ocean, Gulf of Aden, and Western 
Pacific, where commercial interests lead, greater security engagement can follow. 
This is particularly the case when China is protecting state-owned industries and 
assets rather than purely private concerns. However, the security and commercial 
problems confronting the Chinese mining project suggest that Afghanistan’s 
internal complexities may prove more of a barrier to an expanded Chinese footprint 
than anything India’s intelligence services can throw up (O’Donnell 2014).
Overall, the Modi government confronts a new security landscape in Afghanistan in 
many ways fundamentally different from its disposition in the 1990s. Indian assets 
are more entrenched there under what remains a very friendly political regime. 
The ANSF should hold together – and even were it to degenerate into component 
parts, many of them would remain disposed to Indian interests. Iran could be a 
better partner for India in Afghanistan if it is less internationally isolated and enjoys 
a more normal relationship with the United States. On the other hand, new and 
unfriendly actors like China complicate the calculus for India. So does the greater 
potency of violent Islamic extremist groups operating out of Pakistan or enjoying 
Pakistani support in Afghanistan.  
As India gears up for the next phase of the “Great Game” – having in some ways 
outsourced it to the United States for the past decade – one target for Modi could 
be realization of the Afghan-Pakistan-India transit agreement to essentially deliver 
an India-Afghan FTA. Should Modi wish to follow in Vajpayee’s steps to Lahore to 
declare a new agenda for Indo-Pakistan cooperation, the transit agreement should 
be one objective.
8. Implications for Europe and Recommenda-
tions for Policy
The European Union has a compelling interest in an India that is economically 
dynamic and that is opening its economy further to international trade and 
investment. EU-India negotiations over a comprehensive free trade agreement 
16
                                                          India’s Foreign Policy toward East Asia and the Neighborhood under Modi: 
Implications for Europe
have been in the doldrums for several years, in part due to the absence of economic 
reform and the protectionist/interventionist instincts of the previous Indian 
government.  Now that India is generating rapid economic growth under a reformist 
new leadership that is opening new sectors of the economy to trade and foreign 
investment, EU officials should prioritize conclusion of an FTA as the centerpiece of 
EU-India relations. Such a move would reinforce Prime Minister Modi’s emphasis 
on promoting job growth at home and making India’s economy more competitive 
internationally.  It would also help ensure that Europe is on the radar screen for an 
administration in New Delhi otherwise more focused on relations with East Asia, 
South Asia, the Persian Gulf, and the United States.
Europe and India also share a compelling set of domestic security concerns, 
particularly with respect to home-grown radicalization and terrorism. Both Europe 
and India are also buffeted by the extremist currents emanating from Pakistan, Syria 
and other parts of the greater Middle East. The two sides therefore should launch 
a regular strategic dialogue on homeland security and counter-extremism. This 
could include intelligence exchanges, transfer of surveillance technologies, sharing 
of best practices for domestic security, and an intimate dialogue on how to manage 
home-grown radicalism in the context of governing an open, pluralistic society. 
This dialogue should include a focus on how to protect and strengthen global 
internet freedom, including striking a balance between freedom of information and 
access online, on the one hand, and protecting religious and cultural sensitivities, 
on the other.
Finally, Europe and the United States should cooperate far more closely and 
systematically to develop a new transatlantic strategy for Pakistan. This would be 
in the West’s self-interest. Pakistan is engaged in the world’s fastest buildup of 
nuclear weapons, threatening transatlantic non-proliferation goals. Elements 
within its security establishment employ terrorist groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba as 
proxies against Western forces in Afghanistan and against India. Extremist groups 
operating in Pakistan have been known to inspire terrorist attacks in Western 
capitals and in India. Closer US-European collaboration to strengthen Pakistani civil 
society, improve the rule of law and civilian government administration, and expand 
nuclear safeguards would not only support Western interests; it would also ease 
India’s security conundrum vis-à-vis a neighbor that sponsors terrorism against it.
9. Conclusion
India, the European Union, and the United States are the world’s three largest 
democratic polities.  Together, they can help ensure that the 21st century international 
system remains peaceful, pluralistic, and prosperous. Many European officials will 
readily admit they focus far more on relations with China than with India. This is 
in one sense logical: China has a larger economy and is a more important trade 
and investment partner. But it is also perverse: the values and interests of China 
and Europe clash in fundamental respects on issues like freedom of the seas and 
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